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Introduction 
Tobias Kelly, Ian Harper and Akshay Khanna 
In the spring of 2013, the parents of Robbie Crane, a severely disabled thirteen year 
old boy, won an out of court settlement of over £7 million from the English National 
Health Service. When Robbie was born he was seriously ill with a congenital heart 
defect. He underwent an operation when he was just a few days old, which seemed to 
be a success.1 However, something went wrong during the ventilation afterwards. 
Robbie was left with cerebral palsy, limited speech, learning difficulties, and 
behavioural problems. He will require round the clock care for the rest of his life. The 
settlement was designed to reflect compensation for any medical negligence as well as 
cover the cost of Robbie’s future care. Such cases are far from rare. According to a 
report in 2012, the English NHS spent over £15 billion on medical negligence claims 
a year.2 That is nearly one seventh of the entire NHS budget. 
Ian Brady appeared before a mental health tribunal in Manchester in the 
summer of 2013. Brady is one of the most notorious serial killers in modern British 
history. In 1966, he was found guilty of the murder of three children and sentenced to 
life imprisonment. Nearly twenty years after first being sent to prison, Brady was 
diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic with a severe personality disorder, and sent to 
1 ‘£7.3m payout for brain-damaged boy from Hertfordshire’, BBC News, 13 March 2013, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-21861568 
2‘NHS facing £15.7bn for rising number of clinical negligence claims’, Daily Telegraph, 7 February 
2012, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9065534/NHS-facing-15.7bn-for-rising-
number-of-clinical-negligence-claims.html  
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a high security psychiatric hospital. In 1999 he went on hunger strike, protesting 
against his incarceration. As Brady was being detained in a psychiatric hospital, 
doctors were permitted to continue his treatment and force feed Brady against his will. 
Brady was therefore appearing before the tribunal to argue that he was no longer 
mentally ill and should be transferred to prison, so that he could have control over the 
time and manner of his own death.3 His appeal was turned down. 
In December 1998 Diane Blood gave birth to a baby boy. The boys’ biological 
father had died more than four years previously.4 Following a protracted legal battle, 
Ms Blood had won the right to artificial insemination with her husband’s sperm. Ms 
Blood and her husband had been planning to have children when he was struck down 
with meningitis. She persuaded the doctors to remove her partner’s sperm whilst he 
lay on life support. However, because the sperm was not removed with Mr Blood’s 
consent, the hospital was not legally allowed to hand it over to Ms Blood. In February 
1998, Ms Blood won the right to take the sperm abroad. The court ruled that although 
it was illegal to use sperm taken without consent in the UK, there was nothing in the 
law that prevented the insemination taking place outside the country. Ms Blood would 
eventually have two sons, Liam and Joel, after visiting a Belgian clinic.  It was not 
until 2002, and a change in the law, that Mr Blood’s name could be put on the birth 
certificate, as prior to this fathers who were dead at the moment of conception could 
not be legally recognised as parents.  
3 ‘Moors Murderer Ian Brady banned from carrying pens’, BBC News, 18 June 2013, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
22953626  
4 ‘A baby boy for Diane Blood’, Independent, 12 December 1998, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/a-baby-boy-for-diane-blood-1190812.html 
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In 2001 Stephen Kelly was found guilty of recklessly causing injury to another 
by the High Court of Justiciary in Glasgow after infecting a woman to whom he had 
not declared his HIV status. Sentenced to five years in prison, this was the first 
successful case of the criminalisation of HIV transmission in Scotland (Chalmers 
2002). Beyond the UK, in many parts of the world HIV transmission has been 
criminalised. Despite limited evidence that this has any public health benefit, a 
number of other countries have now added this measure as an aspect of the attempts to 
control the HIV epidemic.  
Between 400 and 1,200 patients died ‘as a result of poor care’ at Stafford 
Hospital between January 2005 and March 20095. These deaths were revealed 
through statistical analysis, which enabled comparisons of death rates to be produced 
between hospitals, raising alarms should these lie outside of a deemed acceptable 
range. In a damning indictment of audit practices, Robert Francis, QC, the barrister 
chairing the public enquiry that followed suggested that the ‘NHS culture’ was to 
blame, and that this focused ‘on doing the system's business – not that of the 
patients’.6 This stimulated an ongoing debate into the question of legal sanctions, and 
whether senior managers at the NHS could face criminal prosecution if they are 
deemed to be not open about mistakes that are made, or whether already available 
provision of manslaughter law that can be levelled against doctors, or a corporate 
version of this, could force greater accountability.  
5 ‘Mid Staffs report calls for sweeping changes to improve patient safety’, The Guardian, 6 February 
2013, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/06/mid-staffordshire-report-sweeing-
changes?guni=Article:in%20body%20link 
6 ‘NHS culture at Mid Staffs that tolerated low standards and sold patients short’, The Guardian, 6 
February 2013, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/06/nhs-mid-staffs 
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As the above five examples attest, law and medicine can be caught in a tight 
embrace. Although the examples above are all taken from the UK, similar processes 
are at work around the world, from the US to India, from the Czech Republic to South 
Africa, from France to Germany, Guatemala, Brazil and beyond. Clinicians may try 
and heal pain and suffering, but what counts as necessary or unnecessary suffering, 
suffering that should be prevented or allowed to continue, can be decided by the law. 
Furthermore, when medicine is unable to heal, the law can be called upon to provide 
redress. Litigation is often seen as the answer to medical needs, and public health 
claims when doctors and public health physicians come up against their limits. 
Medical negligence cases, such as Robbie Crane’s, for example, involve lawyers 
deciding what clinicians can and should have done when confronted by a sick patient, 
as well as providing financial remedy for clinically inflicted distress. In the Brady 
mental health tribunal, it was the judges who had to decide which clinical diagnosis 
was most appropriate, and therefore implicitly whether the suffering caused by force-
feeding was worse than the suffering caused by lack of treatment and potential 
suicide.  It was not doctors who would decide how Brady would end his life, but a 
judge. In 2001 it was a judge who made the decision that Stephen Kelly was guilty of 
recklessly injuring his girlfriend when he failed to tell her he had HIV and 
subsequently infected her. Following the Mid Staffordshire Hospital deaths, it was 
suggested that criminal negligence charges might also be levelled at senior managers 
in the NHS. As such, and at multiple levels, medicine can be said to operate in the 
shadow of the law, as clinical, public health and institutional decisions are shaped by 
their potential legal outcomes.  
Yet, the movement is not all one way. Legal processes, for example, can rely 
on clinical evidence in order to make decisions.  It is clinicians who tell the court what 
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particular symptoms might mean and what forms of treatment are possible. The 
mental health tribunal relied on psychiatric evidence to decide on whether Brady was 
clinically sane or not. The Robbie Crane litigation similarly needed clinical evidence 
in order to determine whether the staff at the hospital where he was born had 
exercised the required level of care. Law also has to respond to medical advances and 
new forms of diagnosis. Paranoid schizophrenia has been a diagnosis with shifting 
parameters and definitions reflected in the evolving Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM) revisions, but the law is dependent on these shifting terrains of knowledge at 
particular moments in time. It was not proposed as a distinct clinical diagnosis when 
Ian Brady was originally sent to prison in the early 1960s, yet subsequent diagnoses 
were dependent on new categorisations of the condition. The development of IVF as a 
therapeutic treatment has also created new and challenging legal problems. Issues of 
parenthood, such as in the Diane Blood case, would simply not be legal problems if it 
was not for clinical developments. In another register, it has been the development of 
the capacity to collate and analyse complex statistical data sets that has allowed the 
emergence of thinking of larger institutional complexes as legal entities in relation to 
health outcomes.  
The ways in which we acknowledge, and attach importance to pain and 
suffering, can be understood as a constitutive feature of modern political and social 
life (Brown 1995). They are deeply implicated in what it means to be human in 
contemporary societies. Alongside, or even instead of, a concern with equality, 
exploitation and fairness, claims about the nature, distribution and adequacy of the 
response to pain and suffering play an important part on the formation of collective 
identities and the distribution of resources. Pain and suffering, however, are never 
self-evident. Neither are the responses to pain and suffering. What counts as necessary 
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and unnecessary, preventable and unpreventable distress, and what counts as adequate 
and suitable responses are profoundly political and cultural processes. Law and 
medicine are key to this wider politics of harm, deciding on what counts as injury, and 
what are the most suitable forms of redress. But they both also claim to lay out spaces 
for redemption, for cure, for healing and redress.  
As law and medicine respond to harm and suffering, they become entwined. 
Let’s take the concept of injury, for example, to illustrate the close relationship. Injury 
is a legal term par excellence. It derives from the Latin words ‘in’ and ‘jus’, meaning 
‘against justice’ (Jain 2006: 4). Legally speaking, injury involves a violation of rights. 
Yet, although injury can imply financial loss, or damage to reputation, the 
archetypical modern image of injury is a body (or mind) in pain. Injury is therefore 
widely seen as a problem that can be addressed through medical intervention. 
However, the very fact that we refer to physical or mental damage by a term that 
implies justice or its absence, despite us not being necessarily conscious of this 
metaphorical inheritance, speaks to the powerful place of law in our imaginations of 
harm. 
Death too, to give another example, is simultaneously a medical and a legal 
category rather than the self-evident end of life. As Margaret Lock has famously 
shown, the category of brain death requires both clinical and legal interventions 
(2002). Developments in medical technology have forced a re-evaluation of the very 
distinction between life and death. In order for organs to be harvested for donation, 
bodies have to be legally dead – or a clinician could be charged with homicide – but 
clinically alive, as otherwise the organs would be medically useless. Anglo-American 
law has decided that this event takes place in the brain, rather than the heart. Medicine 
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had to respond by providing ways in which the exact time of brain death could be 
identified. 
The relationship between law and medicine can, equally, be symbiotic or 
collaborative. In a sense, both law and medicine may be understood as practices in the 
management of uncertainty. In the context of law, this is not just in relation to 
‘subjective’ elements such as ‘intention’ and mens rea7, but in the very processes 
through which ‘facts’ are assessed, produced and appreciated in a court of law. This is 
most obvious in adversarial systems of law, where litigating parties are typically 
engaged in the making of objects and chronologies intelligible. The production of 
‘facts’ is thus contingent upon such things as the resources available to contesting 
parties, the diversity of principles in laws relating to procedure and evidence, the 
political milieu, and most significantly, the very ability of the court to sense, 
recognise and name objects. The legal process is in this sense the identification of 
‘true’ facts in the face of ambiguity. The practice of medicine as well, as several 
papers in this volume suggest, is about the production of facts in the face of disparate 
possibilities. The process of diagnosis, for instance, is an inherently inter-subjective 
process where physicians and patients are entangled in a negotiation of their realities, 
and the languages and metaphors through which bodily or psychological experiences 
gain intelligibility. The diagnosis of a syndrome such as AIDS, i.e. the enumeration 
7 In jurisprudence criminal responsibility is, broadly, based on the assessment of two elements – the 
‘actus reus’ (‘guilty act’) relating to whether a given act has been done by a person or not (did X pull 
the trigger, for instance), and ‘mens rea’ (‘guilty mind’) or the ‘mental state’ that makes the act 
meaningful (did X ‘intend’ to kill Y by pulling the trigger? Did s/he intend to simply injure Y? Did s/he 
know that pulling the trigger might cause the death of Y? Ought X have known that this act might lead 
to the death of y? Etc.). Except where there is an explicit admission of intention, mens rea is typically 
‘inferred’ – it cannot, strictly speaking, be ‘known’, but rather be assumed.   
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of, and identification of ‘symptoms’ and the recognition of patterns, is an obvious 
case in point. Here again we see the socially, economically, politically, procedurally 
and epistemologically contingent process of producing certainty in the face of 
ambiguity. What is interesting is the ways in which, often, both law and medicine 
project the responsibility of this management of uncertainty onto each other, thus 
mutually re-affirming their positivist claims, their authority in speaking objective 
truths.  
Yet the relationship between law and medicine can also be deeply uneasy. The 
ways in which lawyers and clinicians try and understand the world, as well as the 
responses they put in place can be very different. Lawyers may understand harm 
through legal languages and definitions of injury, victim and perpetrator. Medical 
practitioners might think about harm in terms of categories of disease and pathology 
translated from the subjective illnesses of patients. The law courts allocate 
compensation and redress. Medical practitioners try to alter the course of disease 
processes, and thus heal and alleviate suffering, albeit within narrow medically 
defined parameters.  As two high status forms of expert knowledge, it is not always 
clear which, or how, either should predominate in particular contexts. The law can 
marshal far greater resources, it can decide what can and should be done, and invoke 
legal sovereignty to do so. However, it is this political dominance of the law that 
medicine counters through access to levels of intimate knowledge that is simply 
unavailable to the law. A legal decision might provide formal redress – which in 
certain circumstances might assist with healing as broadly socially defined – but 
clinicians can, and frequently do, improve the subjective feelings of being unwell 
through their clinical interventions. 
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Anthropology, the law and medicine 
Historically, legal and medical anthropology have often talked past each other. We 
publish in different journals and go to different conference panels. Yet, over the last 
ten years at least there has been an increasing convergence of analytical and 
ethnographic interests. Issues such as biological citizenship and its wider family of 
terms (Petryna 2003; Rose 2007; Nguyen 2010) have brought the importance of rights 
and the sovereign power of the state over bodies, life and death to the heart of medical 
anthropology (Das and Poole 2004; Inda 2005). Similarly, a concern with the 
provision of pharmaceuticals and their place within particular economies of 
ownership and need, has meant that legal property regimes have been a key object of 
analysis (Petryna, Lakoff and Kleinman 2006; Hayden 2007; Petryna 2009). Many 
medical anthropologists have become interested in exploring the implications of 
institutional and expert responses to suffering, turning to issues historically more 
associated with legal anthropology, such as human rights, citizenship, and 
bureaucracy (Farmer 2001, 2004; Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Beihl & Petryna 2013; 
Redfield 2013).  
In this volume we acknowledge these intellectual shifts and explore the 
intersections of, and relationship between, law and medicine. The book asks: How do 
those working in law and medicine seek to understand harm and suffering, and 
allocate remedies? What are the points of convergence and contradiction between law, 
medicine and their own sub-disciplines, as they seek to understand and respond to 
harm and suffering? Are new spaces for political and moral action created by the 
intersection of law and medicine? Crucially, we do not take the central role of law and 
medicine in responses to harm and suffering as self-evident. As law and medicine 
define and categorise, options are closed down, just as new ones are opened up. What 
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happens, for example, to a sense of mutual obligation for the sick and unwell when 
they are framed in terms of legal rights? What issues arise when medical care is 
determined and overshadowed by the potential for criminal redress? Such questions 
allow us to explore the relationship between a politics of suffering, expert claims to 
privilege insight, and the potential for remedy and redress. Rather than reify law and 
medicine as two separate ways of interacting with the world abstracted from each 
other and their conditions of entanglement, we argue that responses to harm and 
suffering have to be understood in terms of their enactment and engagement within 
specific local contexts. Hence, the issues are ones that are fundamentally and 
necessarily open to ethnographic investigation.  
The volume is organised into two sections. The first section deals with the 
different ways in which legal and medical processes understand, confront and 
conceptualise harm and suffering, in short, an epistemological exploration. The 
second section deals with the ways in which law and medicine understand and 
allocate remedies to harms, that is the more practical side of how interventions are 
managed. The distinction between understanding harm and providing remedy is of 
course not hard and fast. Remedy is only possible once harms have been identified, 
and harms are seldom categorized for abstract reasons, but often with the aim of 
providing some form of alleviation. While there may be a case for some of the 
chapters appearing in either section, we have made the division as a way of pulling 
out and emphasising important analytical themes and as a heuristic undertaking. 
Before addressing issues of pain and suffering, remedy and redress in more detail, it 
will be useful to examine what types of expert knowledge are represented by both law 
and medicine? 
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Expert knowledge 
Law and medicine are both highly technical forms of expert knowledge. They seek to 
define, categorise and regulate. Indeed, they may be the archetypal form of modern 
expertise (Carr 2010). Law and medicine are both backed by powerful institutions and 
bureaucracies, such as hospitals and courts, not to mention universities. Law and 
medicine are high status, highly paid professions, represented by powerful lobbying 
bodies. They are also both learnt at university, and contain languages and forms that 
are only available to the initiated (Sinclair 1997; Mertz 2007). Law and medicine both 
fundamentally involve a claim to superior positivist knowledge by those who speak in 
their name. Finally, in all their technical specialisms, law and medicine can also both 
be seen as highly pragmatic forms of knowledge, concerned with getting things done, 
rather than philosophical hair-splitting or political negotiation. Doctors want to make 
their patients better. Lawyers want to come to a final legal decision.  
However, even though law and medicine may both be pragmatic disciplines, 
they can produce very different relationships between means and ends. Legal 
processes aim to seek finality, as they look to end the debate and come to a legal 
decision. In doing so, they frequently turn in on themselves, referring to little else than 
the law. As Bruno Latour has famously argued, writing about the French Conseil 
D’Etat, legal decision-making is a process of trying to move beyond questions of fact 
as fast as possible, in order to arrive at legal debates (2004). Legal processes then 
become concerned fundamentally with reaching a decision that is legally justifiable, 
rather than making a profound statement. The law is what matters, not the outside 
world (Riles 2006). Law, ideologically at least, claims a self-referentiality, that 
gestures to other laws, and other cases. Whilst new objects and issues are constantly 
entering the legal realm, especially following developments in medicine and clinical 
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practice, legal regimes always try and articulate these new arrivals within self-
referential terms, as though they already always existed in the legal realm, and are 
merely finding articulation through new interpretation.8 As far as legal actors are 
concerned, there is no need to look elsewhere, as in the end, it is the judge who 
decides what happens and the outcome of a legal case. As such, once a decision is 
reached, it is final. In the common law system it can be appealed, but only on matters 
of law, not on fact. The facts of the case are frozen in time when a judge comes to a 
decision. Law decides on both the means and the ends. 
Medical decisions, in contrast, are often provisional and open to being revised 
in the light of clinical advances or as a patient’s health fails or improves. As Foucault 
famously argued, modern medicine is marked by a concern with observation and the 
clinical gaze (2003). Clinical categories may shape what is seen, and the clinician may 
cultivate a sense of detachment from the body being observed, but the clinician 
always returns to that same body. Medicine has no luxury of near total self-
referentiality.  It must always look beyond itself to the sick patient, whose responses it 
can never totally control. Although medicine too is a field with a strong sense of its 
own traditions, canons, and principles, however diverse, any attempt to transform the 
world into its own terms can reach its limits when it confronts a mind or body in pain 
which seems to resist medical intervention. A diagnosis is only useful and clinically 
correct if it helps the patient’s condition improve. There is relatively less space to 
8 The enrichment of the meaning of the ‘Right to Life’ to cover such issues as issues of livelihood, 
bonded labour, child labour, housing, health, privacy, education, sexual harassment at the workplace, 
domestic violence, marriage, clean environment and dignity etc., for instance, is seen not as an 
introduction of new objects into the law, but merely the act of a more full interpretation of already 
existing provisions. 
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switch off the outside world, to say ‘clinically speaking the decision was right’. 
Biographical narrative, individual history and life intervene (Bowker and Starr 1999). 
It is no coincidence that many General Practitioners and community health workers 
rapidly come up against the limits of the purer forms of disease abstraction in the 
everydayness of their patients’ lives, and turn to other modalities of intervention to 
help them in their struggles with being subjectively unwell. Medical means and ends, 
when compared to the law at least, are relatively more open and contingent. 
A contrast between a ‘distanced’ law and an ‘engaged’ medicine can be 
overplayed of course. Lawyers are not always unconcerned with the outside world. 
Doctors too can also be, relatively satisfied with a clinical outcome, irrespective of 
how the patient feels about it. An asthma sufferer for example, may have a decrease in 
the constriction of their bronchioles – the medical outcome of an intervention – but 
still not feel that well in themselves. A surgical intervention might be a technical 
success, even in the absence of subjective improvement in wellbeing. Furthermore, to 
talk about law and medicine, the clinic and the court, doctors, and lawyers, as unified 
entities, and coherent bodies of knowledge is untenable. Whilst both law and 
medicine may have relative coherence as professional identities, both also have a 
tendency to fracture and contradict, breaking down into sub-fields. Criminal law, civil 
law, and administrative law can have very different assumptions and goals, as can 
surgery, psychiatry, public health, and palliative care, to give but a few examples.  In 
such situations, law and medicine have been known to submit to one another, the 
ability to resolve internal contradictions. The recent case where the Supreme Court of 
India reinstated Section 377, the colonial anti-sodomy law, provides us with an 
instance of this. Parties on both sides of the litigation introduced medical evidence to 
support their cases – those that sought to get rid of the antiquated law filed evidence 
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that homosexuality was no longer considered a ‘disease’, that the protection of human 
rights of same-sex desiring people was a central tenet of public health policy, and that 
the continuation of the law in force had mental health implications for Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual and Transgender citizens. The parties in support of the law similarly 
introduced medical opinion to the contrary, claiming that homosexuality was indeed a 
curable affliction, one responsible for the spread of the HIV epidemic and which must 
thus remain criminalised. The court, in this case, was called upon to act as an arbiter 
of what constituted ‘good’ science, and to resolve the apparent conflict within the 
realm of medicine. Conversely, in the making of HIV/AIDS policy, the government’s 
National AIDS Control Organisation was essentially tasked with the responsibility of 
identifying ‘good’ law, having to decide between the fact that homosexuality was, in 
effect, criminalised under Indian law, and the constitutionally guaranteed Right to 
Life, which included the Right to Health. What we see here is a circularity, where the 
practices of law and medicine draw upon each other for the resolution of their own 
internal conflicts, and always in the context of pragmatic questions. As inherently 
pragmatic disciplines and sub-disciplines, law and medicine are always context 
specific, trying to answer very particular questions at very particular moments, and for 
particular ends.  
There is an obvious danger in presenting law and medicine as self-enclosed, 
all powerful forms of knowledge, despite the sovereign forms of power invested in 
them. It is also important to recognise their limits, hesitations and inconsistencies. 
Neither law, nor medicine, even in their own eyes, are all knowing and all seeing. 
There are limits to their expertise. People will die for reasons that are beyond medical 
knowledge; indeed, death itself brings medicine abruptly up against the limits of its 
domain (even if defining the moment of its coming can be complicated). The law can 
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become confused. Clinical categories can contradict one another – as different 
bundles of signs and symptoms from the reading of the contours of the body are 
placed in different diagnostic categories as can the law. Judges are as fallible as 
doctors. It is in these spaces of uncertainty that innovation can take place. It is here 
that the space for ethnographic investigation is most needed. Law and medicine, in all 
their various and contradictory forms interact and contradict, producing new 
potentials and closing down old. 
Recognising harm and suffering 
The pictures from Abu-Ghraib seemed to shock most of the world. Images of Iraqi 
men being humiliated and punished by their smiling American captors sent out a 
chilling message. For many people, such photographs seemed to encapsulate all that 
was wrong with the Anglo-American invasion. Even those who supported the war 
professed to be shocked and sickened by what they were shown. The photographs of 
bodies in pain appeared to provide self-evident and easily recognisable evidence of 
wrong doing that transcended political, cultural and religious boundaries. Complex 
arguments about international law or military strategy paled into insignificance 
alongside pictures of a naked man with electrodes attached to his fingers. Whilst we 
might differ on issues of international politics, it was as if we could all come together 
to agree that the treatment of prisoners in this way was wrong. 
Suffering and pain seem universal. As Miriam Ticktin has argued, there is a 
widespread assumption that we recognise suffering as self-evident because it seems to 
be universal human experience (2011: 11; see also Fassin and Rechtman 2009). But 
suffering and pain must be made legible, categorised, and distinguished, in order to be 
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given moral and social meaning. Whilst being widely thought of as universal, pain 
and suffering can appear inscrutable. Elaine Scarry famously argued that physical 
pain leads to the unmaking of the world, and can stand beyond language (1984). It is 
the ability of the torture, for example, to destroy our capacity for language and 
communication that, for Scarry, makes it so morally problematic. Yet, as Veena Das 
has persuasively written, pain is never simply a private experience, but has 
fundamentally social dimensions (1997). The statement, ‘I am in pain’ does not 
simply describe an interior state, but also voices a complaint, a call for help and 
assistance. The issue is both one of the person in pain communicating their 
experiences, and crucially of the audience to see, hear and recognise what is in front 
of them.  
Law and medicine are two privileged sites for the recognition of pain and 
suffering and involve very particular ways of seeing and knowing. The reading of the 
mind or body for signs of pain are historically located processes, and are as much 
aesthetic and technical, as emotional. The result is that some forms of pain and 
suffering are discursively brought into view, where as others are left illegible. Harm 
must be made legible in order to be politically and socially salient. Marsland 
examines in this volume, how public health bylaws allow the Tanzanian state to make 
visible forms of harm, those derived from witchcraft, mourning and inheritance – 
forms that are deemed traditional and superstitious. In 2002, new bylaws legislating 
against traditions of the Nyakyusa deemed to be detrimental to public health were 
announced throughout Kyela District (Tanzania). In this chapter, she shows how 
particular articulations of ‘tradition’ in public health and law produce particular 
visions of harm. Once identified and made visible, they can become the focus of state 
sanctioned reform.  
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The clinical gaze has a very particular way of reading the body for signs of 
suffering, illness and disease. As Michel Foucault famously argued, there was a shift 
in the late eighteenth century towards inferential interpretation of outward signs 
(2003; Crossland 2009). Diseases came to be thought to be knowable through their 
observable symptoms. Otherwise hidden and unobservable processes could now be 
seen and heard. In her contribution to this volume, Ticktin explores how an inferential 
logic that attempts to read signs of suffering for hidden causes, can be applied to ever 
new contexts. For Ticktin, the ‘innocent victim’ is deemed the most morally 
legitimate recipient of humanitarian interventions. However, as more and more is 
revealed about victims and survivors, the more and more innocence is compromised. 
The attempt to reveal and make legible risks undermining the humanitarian project. In 
this context, after children, non-human animals can become the locus of this search 
for innocence. Meaningful signs of suffering previously observed in humans can be 
read from the bodies of non-human animals. Humanitarian psychiatry, for example, is 
applied to non-human animals. Elephants are diagnosed with PTSD. Veterinary 
forensic medicine also becomes a diagnostic tool for revealing animal suffering, as 
well as importantly human cruelty. Whilst a concern with animal suffering is far from 
new, in the early twenty-first century it is increasingly perceived through technical 
forms, which were previously linked to human beings. In doing so, Ticktin shows 
how humanitarian techniques can be spread to novel areas, revealing ever wider forms 
of suffering as morally urgent. 
Law and medicine do not simply bring particular forms of pain and suffering 
into view. They also attribute moral and political meanings to that pain and suffering. 
Not all pain and suffering is thought to be problematic. Pain and suffering on their 
own have no inherent social or political implication, it engenders no ‘natural’ 
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response (Laqueur 1989). Above all, attributing a cause to suffering can make it seem 
relatively legitimate or illegitimate, acceptable or unacceptable, a source of moral 
scandal, or a source of moral reassurance. Pain and suffering without an apparent 
cause, can create particular disquiet. But, as Clifford Geertz wrote, if pain and 
suffering can be attributed with a cause, people can ‘morosely or joyfully, grimly or 
cavalierly… endure it’ (Geertz 1977: 104). Objectifying back pain, for example, 
through x-rays that reveal lesions can bring great relief: a cause has been found and it 
is ‘not all in the mind’, a judgement that can be hugely stigmatising (Jackson 1989). If 
suffering is seen to have different causes it can engender very different moral 
responses. The pain from falling out of a tree, or drinking too much alcohol, produces 
different social and political reactions to the pain caused by child abuse, or cancer, to 
give but a few examples. The attribution of causes can make pain and suffering 
morally meaningful, and socially acceptable. 
Law and medicine are two of the central devices used for distinguishing 
between different types of cause. Yet, as Kelly shows in this volume, both forms of 
expert knowledge can have very different understandings of causation. His chapter 
focuses on medico-legal reports written about torture survivors in the UK immigration 
and asylum process. Legally speaking, torture is not just pain and suffering, but pain 
and suffering deliberately inflicted by public agents for specific purposes. Medico-
legal reports are therefore asked to attest to the apparent causes of scars and marks left 
on people’s bodies. Yet, medical and legal understandings of causation can come into 
conflict. Legal processes try and strip away all other possible causes, only to be left 
with those that are deemed legally relevant. They also rely on a positive and 
mechanistic notion of change. Medical notions of causation can be, in contrast, much 
more open ended, and subject to revision, depending on how a patient responds. 
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Medical notions of causation can also operate at several levels simultaneously with 
causal agents including insects, bacteria, or even lifestyles. It is the difference 
between these two very different ways of conceptualising pain and suffering that 
opens up space to deny that torture has taken place. 
In her contribution to this volume, Lydie Fialová shows how psychiatric 
medicine and criminal law can understand harm in very different ways. Her chapter 
focuses on a Czech psychiatric hospital, and the particular case of a man who she calls 
Josef K.. Josef killed his own mother, but was found not guilty on the grounds of 
insanity. In this process Josef’s act was reclassified from crime to illness. His family, 
however, interpreted the murder as an unforgiveable wrong, whilst Josef was himself 
unsure how to interpret the act – refusing to identify with it in any way. A diagnosis 
of schizophrenia was particularly significant, as schizophrenia was more likely to be 
perceived as external to the person, treatable but not curable – in contrast to 
psychopathy (redefined in the DSM as ‘antisocial personality disorder’), which might 
be seen as an inherent trait of the person. This distinction between causes that were 
seen to be external and those thought to be internal to Josef, had implications for the 
extent to which he was thought to be culpable for the death of his mother. We see 
another example here of the ways in which law and medicine seek to delineate 
different types of causation. Ultimately, though, Fialová suggests that it is impossible 
to draw a neat line between insanity and crime, which is reflected in the very structure 
of secure psychiatric hospitals.  
Anthropology has often criticised institutionalised forms of knowledge for 
abstracting, reifying and distorting the experience of suffering. Adriana Petryna, for 
example, has shown how in the aftermath of the Chernobyl Nuclear disaster, suffering 
was rationalised into a bureaucratic object (2003). Definitions of radiation injury were 
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elaborated through particular technical categories (2003: 35). Legitimate and 
recognised injury was limited to that which was bio-medically measurable and 
calculable. Suffering had to be clinically legible and knowable for it to count, even 
though scientific knowledge in the area was provisional at best. For Veena Das, 
writing in the context of the Union Carbide chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, such 
bureaucratic forms of knowledge result in a constant stripping away from the 
experience of the survivor (1997). Suffering is appropriated through technical forms 
of knowledge. The suffering survivor becomes an object for the exercise of power, 
and the moral implications of their own suffering are effectively extinguished. Such 
criticism of bureaucratisation effectively builds on Lyotard’s notion of the differend 
(1989). For Lyotard, there are situations where wrong doing or harm can not 
adequately be represented. The result is an effective silencing of the victim. It is not 
that they cannot speak, but rather that they cannot express their experiences fully in 
the languages that are demanded by those who might respond. Law and medicine, for 
example, demand that harms be understood and expressed in very specific ways. 
Whether the anthropologist can reclaim these representational spaces, and better 
represent the experience of suffering is a moot point, and one we reflect upon below.  
At one level the critique of bureaucratic forms of knowledge for failing to 
represent the suffering of survivors and victims is very powerful, as it reintroduces an 
ethnographic thickness to the experiences of survivors and the sick. At another level, 
though, there is a danger of failing to treat technical forms of expertise as 
ethnographically interesting in their own right. The suffering of the ‘victim’ is 
presented as the most authentic ground, and potentially flattens suffering itself into 
this particular form of ethnographic truth. It is after all another discursive translating 
away. Yet, when clinicians and lawyers attempt to understand the nature and 
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implications of very specific forms of suffering they do so with very particular ends. 
As fundamentally pragmatic forms of expertise, lawyers and clinicians are not in 
principle concerned with reproducing suffering in its full phenomenological 
complexity (Williams 2007). It would be perverse to reproduce an assault in a 
criminal trial, or for a doctor to deliberately infect themselves with the TB bacillus (as 
witnessed by the response to scientist and HIV denialist Peter Deusberg injecting 
himself with HIV infected blood). Instead, the attempt is to understand assault in 
order to get a criminal conviction, to diagnose TB in order to provide treatment. 
Profound philosophical and political questions about the nature of harm can be 
suspended in the name of getting something done. When clinicians and lawyers 
attempt to understand the nature and implications of very specific forms of suffering 
they can do so with very particular ends, such as allocating legal entitlements or 
providing relief from pain.  
Lawyers can often seem somewhat distanced from suffering. This is not to say 
that there are not many profoundly empathetic lawyers, for whom the nature of 
suffering is of great importance. It is to say though, that legally speaking, for lawyers 
what is important is not suffering in and of itself, but a breach of a legal norm. Indeed, 
some forms of suffering may be deemed legal, such as that caused by the death 
penalty, incarceration, and therefore legally irrelevant in and of themselves. Courts do 
not object, necessarily, to the pain of state execution, as this is seen, in many 
jurisdictions as being legally justified. Harm must also take on a particular structure to 
be legally recognised. To be a legal violation, there must be a victim and a 
perpetrator. Structural harms, and those that are not the product of some sort of 
intentional action or negligence are hard to legally recognise. Evidential barriers must 
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also be met.  Legally persuasive proof must be provided that a harm has taken place, 
and that a particular person is culpable.  
Distance from suffering is not so straight-forward for all clinicians. Again this 
is not to say that clinicians do not comprehend suffering though distinct clinical 
categories. It is to point out again though, that a clinician can be forced to confront the 
body in front of them, in ways that lawyers are not. There are of course many forms of 
medicine that, in practice, abstract away from the body. Laboratory technicians, which 
deal with blood samples, viruses and baccili, are an obvious example, However, there 
are other forms of medicine, such as General Pracitioners, for example, who 
constantly have to deal with and respond to the person in front of them. The result is 
that the ethical tensions faced by such clinicians in the face of perceived suffering can 
be particularly acute. In her chapter in this volume Estelle d’Halluin shows the 
tensions between pragmatic, technical and ethical forms of action. d’Halluin’s chapter 
examines how French doctors decide whether or not to produce medico-legal reports 
for immigrants and asylum seekers. These reports can play a central role in 
persuading the French immigration authorities whether or not to allow the migrant to 
stay in France or not. Some doctors follow mechanical procedures, where they simply 
document every clinical fact, irrespective of the potential impact of doing so for the 
client’s asylum case. Some doctors will decide whether to produce certificates, not on 
the basis of clinical signs but on whether they believed the client’s story. Others will 
refuse if they think the certificate will be harmful to the client’s asylum case. For 
d’Halluin, clinicians can be torn between the empathetic desire to be close to their 
clients’ and the demand to produce a formal technical document. The result is a fine-
grained and context specific negotiation of what might count as justice.  
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Forensic medicine produced a very specific manner of making the body 
legible, and of bringing harm into view for particular ends. Neither entirely legal, nor 
entirely clinical, forensic practice can sit awkwardly at the juncture between legal and 
medical means and ends.  In his chapter in this volume, Rees examines the tensions 
between the production of legal evidence and the need to provide therapeutic care 
when forensic nurses are confronted with rape survivors.  Forensic Medical 
Examiners in Canada and the UK have clinical obligations to survivors of rape, yet 
they must also collect evidence from the body of the person before them, and maintain 
a critical distance from the account that the complainant is providing. Any dichotomy 
of objective evidence and subjective care though is partially collapsed, as a more or 
less compassionate approach to patient care can change the ways in which evidence is 
collected. Sympathetic care can produce more legally persuasive evidence. Rees’s 
chapter also ultimately reminds us that the line between the recognition of harm and 
the allocation of remedy is far from absolute. Recognition can in itself be a form of 
remedy, and remedy cannot begin before recognition takes place. Post rape 
interventions therefore combine elements of the legal and the medical, creating a new 
space of action, a point that will be taken up in the final section of this introduction. 
Understanding and allocating remedy 
The second section of this collection deals with the ways in which law and medicine 
understand and allocate remedies to harm. Medicine can aim to heal and alleviate. The 
medical definition of remedy is a specific treatment for an injury or a disease 
condition. But legal processes can also produce relief and repair. More generally, 
remedy means to redress a moral wrong, or specifically legal redress when used in 
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law. In this process, both law and medicine can both come up against the limits of 
their knowledge and the capacity to shape the world, deferring to one another. The 
finality of law can provide ‘closure’ to clinical uncertainty, and vice versa, clinical 
practice can provide an attempt to intervene directly in minds and bodies that more 
distanced forms of legality find difficult.  
Human rights legislation as applied to health has been central to the changing 
boundaries between medicine and the law in relation to the application of remedy. 
Biehl’s chapter in this volume explores this development, and examines how the 
Brazilian courts are intervening in deciding who gets medical treatment and in what 
ways. In the wake of the rise of rights based activism into access to HIV/AIDS 
treatment right-to-health litigation has become the key mechanism through which 
Brazilians are able to access healthcare. This richly ethnographic chapter reveals how 
the boundaries of the medical and legal are frequently blurred, where we see ‘the 
judiciary as a sort of pharmacy, the public defender as physician, the physician as 
activist, the patient association as a legal council...’. Anthropology here has to 
struggle with these boundaries, and the complexity and contradictions in our taken for 
granted understanding of the roles, functions and norms of these institutional forms. 
In a biopolitical context where public health has become increasingly both privatised 
and more and more dependent on the consumption of pharmaceuticals (or 
pharmaceuticalisation), the right of access to pharmaceuticals has come to 
predominate. Access to medical remedies here, in this fast changing public system, 
particularly for the poor and marginalised, is mediated through the increasing use of 
the courts. The judges overseeing these cases nearly always grant access to the 
medicines requested, seeing this as being entirely consistent with the constitution and 
the right to health. The law here has come to be seen as a mechanism for access where 
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treatment protocols and cost-effectiveness discourses limit their availability. Seen by 
Biehl as a ‘minimal political belonging’, it is a field of temporal imminence, a legal 
relief to the increasingly market driven field of health and access to services. 
As Biehl points to the potential of human rights legislation in leveraging 
access to remedy in the context of Brazil, Harper’s chapter also points to the limits of 
the legal domain in the realm of public health. The rise of multi-drug resistant 
tuberculosis (MDRTB) across the globe has stimulated differing responses, in varied 
national contexts. He compares the situation of the US with South Africa, and their 
responses to the rise of MDRTB. In the US attempts to regulate and limit the travel of 
one individual diagnosed with MDRTB – Andrew Speaker – as he travelled across 
Europe and to Canada allowed the application of old laws, and called on the idioms of 
post-9/11 security concerns. The ensuing legal tussle over Andrew Speaker’s own 
rights to privacy, as he sued and was in turn counter sued should be read as the 
oscillating limits of the law applied to individual and the publics’ right not to be 
exposed to infection. Remedy here moves beyond that of the individual to that of the 
broader public. When Harper presented this paper to a public health audience in South 
Africa, their reaction to the idea that we can respond to the epidemic by controlling 
the movement of individuals was met with disbelief. This made little sense given the 
scale of the MDR epidemic they are currently facing. The limits of legislation are 
realised in this context – where attempts to deal with the problem in fortressed 
hospitals has been met with resistance and even riots – and where the current capacity 
to deal with the epidemic is overwhelmed by the scale of the problem. Here the social, 
political, economic and structural complexities become paramount, and point to the 
need to deal with issues more broadly than just through translation into legal and 
juridical debates, or as a problem of regulating the movement of individuals. Here, as 
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with Beihl’s paper, the limits of remedy at the interface of medicine and the law are 
starkly highlighted.    
A potentially more optimistic perspective on the ability of law to provide 
remedies is presented in Richards’ contribution to this volume. In her chapter she 
describes how the terminally ill can turn to the law in order to try and bring closure to 
what would otherwise be ambiguous end of life decisions. She draws on the UK case 
of Debbie Purdy, who was living with multiple sclerosis, and who mounted a legal 
challenge against the potential criminal legal repercussions for her partner, Omar 
Puente, should he assist her in travelling abroad to a jurisdiction where she could 
lawfully be helped to die. The Suicide Act in the UK states that it was illegal to assist 
others in the act of suicide. Medically she cannot be cured of this degenerative 
condition, but she turned to the law to provide a remedy that would make her final 
days more bearable – an assisted death. Rather than a dispassionate and abstract 
ruling, the comfort provided by the high court’s ruling in the couple’s favour, 
provided the emotional and moral relief that they sought. Even if the terms of the 
ruling have since been challenged and questioned following their case, it was the law 
that provided a remedy, in the absence of medicine’s capacity to sustain a dignified 
life.  
The three papers in this section attest to the ways in which the law is being 
appropriated in order assist in anticipating future harm.  Borneman, in his contribution 
to this volume, also demonstrates how the vagaries of the future are managed, in this 
case in relation to the clinical rehabilitation for child sex offenders. Drawing on 
fieldwork with sex offenders in Germany, the chapter shows how it is the potential 
risk of repetition that is important for both law and medicine here. While the law 
requires that there is an assurance for the public that there will be no repetition of the 
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act, the therapist attempts to gain access to the unconscious workings of the 
individual, and to articulate transformation at this deepest of psychic levels.  
Ronsbo, in turn, explores how remedy is being provided for, in situations of 
extreme pain and grief, in a context of genocide and conflict. Guatemala emerged 
from decades of violent conflict, and with this, up to 200,000 individuals were killed 
or disappeared. A network of organisations drew on psychosocial interventions to 
focus on the survivors and assist in the alleviation of their suffering. These ‘platforms 
of recognition’ are the result of a field of interaction involving donors and NGOs 
(thus within the field of development), and therapists and their clientele in this 
particular political context. This approach to the idea of remedy as trauma moves 
beyond the conceptualisation of trauma as a tool of ‘empire’ (Fassin and Reichtman 
2009) to the inherently relational emergence, where traditional relationships of 
patronage are reformed by newer claims based on a rights based framework. A new 
space is thus carved out where new hopes and fears are expressible in the emergent 
Guatemalan democracy.  
  
The political space between law and medicine 
We see through these chapters how, as law and medicine interact, potentially new 
forms of political action, understandings of harm and forms of redress are produced. 
The spaces between the clinic and the court create the possibility for new claims 
based on the sick or vulnerable body or the traumatised mind.  
Crucially, these claims cannot simply be reduced to the claims of legal 
subjects. This is a much fuller notion of legal personhood that cannot be reduced to 
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formal citizenship or its absence. The people making them are seen to bleed, to 
haemorrhage and to cry in pain. Nor, though, are these claims that can be reduced to 
the biological substrate upon which medicine ekes out its interventions. They do not 
simply involve biological forms of living, and cannot be reduced to ‘bare life’. Rather, 
they involve active and often disruptive claims and counter claims that do not fit 
neatly into legal categories, based as they are on the lived experience of pain, 
suffering and its potential alleviation. At stake here are forms of subject making that 
cannot simply be reduced to subjectification. If they are biological citizens, or 
therapeutic citizens, or pharmaceutical citizens (Rose 2007; Petryna 2003; Nguyen 
2010; Ecks 2005), they are citizens in the sense of being active, entitled and often 
unruly, embedded into institutions of rule, but never wholly subsumed by them. They 
are, in this sense, subjects gaining intelligibility, simultaneously, in at least the two 
registers of law and medicine, but inscribed in the space between them.  
The above insight has significant implications for the ways in which we 
understand the forms and possibilities of the subject of political action. Foucault’s 
undeniable influence on both legal and medical anthropology has often implied an 
underlying concern with the question of the constitutive effects of the law and 
medicine respectively. The assumption here is that these discourses somehow produce 
subjects. In the context of law, the question is – how does engagement with law 
constitute us as subjects. Structurally similar is the question in the context of medicine 
– of how engagement with medical discourse and apparatus, in requiring us to occupy 
the ‘patient role’ for instance, generates the conditions for the relationship with the 
self. But as the papers in this volume suggest, innovations in and of the subject lie 
between these registers, in the tensions and resolutions within and between them. The 
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political subject, then, cannot be considered through a focus on the constitutive 
potential of these discourses, but rather on their failure to do so.  
The theoretical implication of this argument is that the subject can no more be 
considered an internal conversation instigated by, or circumscribed by, the limits of 
the language of law, or of medicine. Rather, we might consider the subject as the 
effects generated in engagements with these registers, as a series of vehicles that we 
occupy in political contestation. The political subject might then usefully be 
considered as neither ‘internal’ (as in a relationship to the self instigated or required 
by an authoritative discourse), nor ‘external’ (as a performance of a form intelligible 
in the authoritative discourse), but rather, in-between. It is in this sense that the failure 
of law and medicine to constitute the subject generates the space for the political 
subject, and the potential for new, transformative forms of political action. 
 It is as crucial to recognise that as law and medicine interact, and as the space 
between them generates political action, their categories and forms are transformed. 
Crucially, as Ian Hacking has pointed out, clinical categories are not simply abstract 
disembodied forms of regulation. Instead, they have a social life of their own (1995). 
Clinical categories are taken up and used by the people they are applied to. A ‘looping 
effect’ can take place, where clinical categories are given flesh and bones, shot 
through with emotional content as lived realities. People come to live their diagnosis 
as victims of trauma, as autistic, or bi-polar, for example, and in this process the very 
meanings and implications of the applied categories are transformed. Exactly the 
same thing could be said about law.  Legal categories are not simply cold, artificial, 
and distant. They can also be thick and full of meaning, being lived out in everyday 
life. Thus both medical and legal labelling goes to the heart of their experience of 
what it means to be a citizen and even a human being. Law and medicine can be, to 
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paraphrase Hacking, ‘engines for making up people’ (1995), but once these engines 
are started, they can have a life of their own. In the spaces between the clinic and the 
court, there are forms of political and social action that cannot be reduced simply to 
biopower, bare life or neo-liberalism.  Whether this space is seen as restricting and 
regulatory, or liberatory, the juridical languages of rights, law and punishment, create 
the possibility for new claims based on the sick or vulnerable body and the 
traumatised mind. As the chapters in this book attest, the analysis of these news 
spaces is an inherently anthropological project, as the entanglement of law and 
medicine point to crucial deminsion of what it means to be human today.  
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